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Altruism as a purely naturalistic phenomenon self-defeats the term altogether;
however, theology also makes unsubstantiated claims that some behaviors are
purely selfless. I will first define various conceptual forms of altruism and then offer
explanations of the term from neurological, evolutionary and psychological
investigations. Despite the position that altruism can be reduced to a fantastical
impossibility bearing neither the arms of science nor theology, it is also a fallacy to
separate it from a religiously derived supernatural altruism that carries no
implications for the realm of morality.
Veined within the confused conflict
between science and religion, morality
attempts to edify itself as cause to
disestablish evolutionary insights that tend
to reduce humanity to products of chance
and fitness. Deeply associated with human
morality is the ambiguous concept of
altruism; there are arguments that attempt to
split its role between being a liberator of
evolutionary beliefs and a defender of
religious infallibility. While science claims
that altruism is a self-profiting, genetically
derived behavioral trait that has survived
environmental pressures, theology tends to
view it as evidence of Godly influence that
denies humanity from being classified
within phylogenetic clades. Considering
these modifications to the concept of
altruism as an armament, it is necessary to
establish a clear understanding of what
altruism is; its obscurity is that of a singular
dialectal utterance that represents varying
ideas with immensely differing implications
for ideological debates. The typical usage of
the concept of altruism within the scientific
realm consequently self-defeats the term
altogether, while proponents of theological
beliefs make unsubstantiated claims that
certain actions or behaviors are purely
selfless. After clearly distinguishing the
conceptual forms of altruism, explanations
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for rudimentary manifestations of the term
can be discussed via neurological,
evolutionary and psychological
investigations; whereas the case for literal
altruism is reduced to a fantastical
impossibility bearing neither the arms of
science nor theology, it is a fallacy separate
from a religiously derived supernatural
altruism and carries no implications for the
realm of morality.
Defining Altruism
The term altruism must initially be
divided based on varying intensities of effect
on the individual participating in behaviors
or actions. The first is that altruism is
unselfish concern or behavior promoting the
welfare of another person/organism with
absolutely no personal profit. This definition
provokes discourse within philosophical and
psychological categories, often inviting
religious moralists to advocate for evidence
of its manifestation in radically selfless
actions such as in the case of fatal selfsacrifice. The second is that altruism is
concern or behavior that promotes the
welfare of another individual/organism at
some personal cost. This more unrestricted
view of the idea does permit some personal
benefit for the participant, whether initially
or with delayed return. A subset of this
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Evolution of Altruism
With the tenants of survival of the
fittest being ones of selfish competitive
behaviors, the notion of biological altruism
ascends as a seemingly unacquainted trait. If
genes for altruistic behavior were selected
via environmental pressures, it appears
counterintuitive for altruism to be
propagating in a system built on selfsustainability. At the core of natural
selection, genes are the immortal component
of a biological lineage; selfish genes must
benefit generational inheritance whereas
altruistic ones must hinder it.1 Dawkins
proposes an explanation of altruistic
behavior, however, as related to the idea of
selfish genes; by his theory, each individual
gene is a selfish component of an
organismal vector. These vectors exist as
survival machines and constitute a
genetically designed environment that is
assembled via cooperation within a gene
pool. Additionally, a gene is not a singular
entity, but exists as copies of itself contained
within these organismal vectors. The
presence of altruistic genes (ones promoting
prosocial altruistic behavior toward other
individuals) amidst selfish genes has the
potential to self-profit all genes of the
species if cooperation is occurring at the
organismal level.
Several evolutionary theories attempt
to explain the presence of altruistic genes in
humans as products of successful fitness
dependent on cooperation.2 Firstly, the
theory of kin selection coincides with
Dawkins’ selfish gene theory in that these
altruistic genes could have arisen via
cooperation between individuals with
similar gene pools, such as relatives. This

idea is also synonymous with Hamilton’s
inclusive fitness theory in which fitness is
based on numbers of offspring individually
produced and the behaviors that lead to
others of the same species producing
offspring.3 This, however, does not explain
the existence of prosocial behaviors towards
other individuals that are not relatives, or are
different species altogether. Interspecies
altruism disestablishes the notion of similar
genetic material being the only motivation
for altruistic behaviors, and introduces the
idea of environmentally induced, mutually
beneficial, cross-species interactions that
could select for altruistic genes.
The second theory is reciprocal altruism
which may be explained more as a
sociobiological construct in which delayed
cooperation exists to encourage altruistic
behaviors. With this insight, an individual
enacts a behavior characterized by personal
risk and associates it with a return of
personal profit from the other organism that
it interacted with. This makes altruistic
interactions increasingly more likely if
delayed returns are consistent and have
greater reward than the initial input. Thirdly,
group selection theory establishes that the
early days of hominids were ones of
competition over limited resources, and
tribal affiliations arose with association to
individuals requiring grouping to be more
successful than other individuals, or to
compete with other groups. Prosocial
behaviors within the groups would be
altruistic while between-group interactions
would be selfish and competitive.
Individuals lacking genes that would
promote cooperative behaviors would not
produce offspring and consequently the
lineage would terminate.
While these theories all suggest that
an ultimate selfish benefit surpasses any
altruistic behaviors (regarding evolutionary
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definition is biological altruism, which
specifies that the cost to the individual is a
reduction in reproductive capability.
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fitness), it is sometimes difficult to reconcile
certain behaviors within these explanations.
Steyn, a published travel journalist, captured
interactions between a lioness and a family
of baboons that seem to deviate from the
benefit-over-cost Hamiltonian formula. The
lioness killed a mother baboon that was
carrying a single male infant baboon. While
beginning to devour her meal, the lioness
easily noticed the escaping infant. Instead of
a swift death, however, the lioness nurtured
the baboon and acted as if pained by the
circumstances.4 Her fitness was drastically
reduced in this situation for numerous
reasons: 1) She ignored the mother baboon
(meal); 2) she ignored the infant baboon (as
a meal); 3) she violently rejected mating
advances of two male lions (she possibly
may have been defending the infant
baboon).
From a sociobiology standpoint, the
protective actions of the lioness could be
marked as confused maternal instincts by
which the infant baboon in distress elicited a
mistaken sympathetic response from her.
The failure of this hypothesis is that it
assumes that in this instance, the lioness has
a propensity toward being biologically unfit,
which is unlikely considering that the
lineage of lions stretches back to the middle
Pleistocene (.8-1.0 Ma), and modern maned
lions evolved from a single lineage 320–190
Ka ago.5 While the success of the lion rose
through cooperative group hunting in preyrich ecosystems (Serengeti), the resilience of
the species is notable within prey-scarce
ecosystems (Kalahari). The edicts of
population dynamics provide that organisms
approach a carrying capacity based on the
sustainability of their environment. In this
case, a population of predator lions is only
as successful in proliferating viable
offspring as its prey are numerous or
available. Killing an infant baboon would

reduce the potential biomass in the
ecosystem that the lioness could feed on;
that single infant will later become
reproductively capable and provide
exponentially more feeding opportunities.
From this aspect, it is possible that altruistic
prey-mercy toward infants is not a confusion
of instincts, but an evolutionary advantage
over predators that would otherwise
completely reduce their prey population
through non-selective killing and feeding.
The justification provided by
population dynamics loses some stability
when a helper individual sacrifices personal
fitness to improve the fitness of a
competitor. An adult elephant has been
observed attempting to rescue an infant
rhinoceros from a mire while being charged
by the violent mother rhino.6 While
Dawkins suggests that “unconscious
calculations” via an “unspecified
mechanism” manifest as compassion such as
seen here, others suggest that “altruistic
emotions of compassion, empathy and
generosity” may be the missing link, “even
if they serve ‘selfish genes’.”7 Emotion
exists as a concept related to feeling that is
often associated with the motivations of a
mind; it is an element superseding genetic
influences and residing rather in the
organismal attribute of consciousness.
Masson and McCarthy discuss the tendency
for scientists to discourage the
anthropomorphizing of animals which reigns
from a denial of the influences of higher
systems; these deserve as much attention
within the altruism debate as rudimentary,
selfish genes do.
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Neurology of Altruism
Within human social systems,
individuals often attribute literal altruism to
acts of kindness; a prime example is helping
a homeless person. Not only does this
7
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assume that no genetic fitness is gained by
the altruistically acting individual, but
absolutely no personal benefit is received.
Advances in understanding of neurological
systems can confidently map out empathic
responses within the brain that lead to
prosocial behaviors, such as this one.
Studies have found that the anterior insula
(AI) of the insular cortex is the epicenter for
altruistic decision making.8 The AI has been
theorized to be a “sensory-related region”
which “mediates emotional and empathic
experiences” whereas the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) is active with the AI and
provides the drive for “motivated
behaviors.”9 Finally projections onto the
ventral pallidum (VP) from the nucleus
accumbens and amygdala permit altruistic
actions to occur via motor neuron output
from the VP.
The complex theoretical circuitry
provides a feedback system that activates
reward centers of the brain in association
with plans or actions that are empathically
derived from the AI; physiologically, a
reward of pleasure is self-produced from this
process. This in turn denies that empathic
actions derived from conscious motivation
are truly altruistic if they provide a
neurological benefit to the individual.
Evidence of the role of AI in empathic
response appears in a study in which
individuals with lesions to this region had
difficulty identifying if people in pictures
(such as one with their toe being smashed
under a desk) were suffering or not.10
Failure to empathize leads to a decrease in
likelihood to act altruistically on feelings of
motivation (considering they are not there at
all or are limited). Despite this, if an
individual with no empathic motivation (no
pleasurable neurological reward for altruistic
behaviors) acts in a way that is perceived as

altruistic, the psychosocial realm is
implicated in providing a selfish
reinforcement of this behavior.
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Psychology of Altruism
Familiar within the psychoanalytical
discussions are the manifestations of
subdivisions of the mind: a tripartite of id,
ego, and superego.11 Freud’s coined
terminology presents the mind as a selfishlydriven entity by which altruistic actions fit
as similarly as they do into theories of
reciprocal altruism. The id is primal desire,
often for food or sex, with no regard for
other individuals or for reality itself. The
superego is considered the moral
component, but some advocate that it is
more in essence founded upon
environmental factors; it is the subconscious
proponent of societally influenced norms or
expected behaviors, whether immoral or
moral.12 The ego is the moderator between
the two, which are often opposing entities of
the subconscious mind.
Considering a physiologically unbenefited
individual acting altruistically (no
neurological sensations of pleasure), actions
taken would still be influenced by this
underlying psychological system. Avoiding
helping the individual amidst societal norms
that promote altruistic behaviors as expected
would make offense against the superego.
Carveth explains that the “role of
persecutory guilt (superego)” exists “as a
defence against depressive guilt
(conscience).”13 In this aspect, conscious
guilt would arise if no altruistic action was
taken. On the contrary proceeding with the
altruistic action deviates from a negative
psychosocial consequence, and fuels the
desire of the superego; this in turn generates
permissibility of the ego to substantiate the
selfish desires of the id. Thus, unconscious
Heffner, 2016.
Carveth, 2015.
13
Ibid. p. 210.
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aspects of an individual disestablish the
presence of literal altruism within the
actions of someone lacking a conscious
desire to act in a certain sacrificial or selfless
way.
Death and Altruism
Neurological and psychological
theories establish that literal altruism is
obstructed by an inevitable profit to self; this
draws into question the nature of humanity
which various philosophers have attempted
to delineate within the periphery of morality.
Thomas Hobbes proposed that the inherent
selfishness of humanity was so evident that
restrictive systems of government were
necessary to avoid societal chaos. He
personally dealt with the scenario of a
homeless man asking for alms in 17th
century London, which despite his views on
the inherent selfish of mankind, he still
aided the man. When asked if he would still
have assisted him if governmental and
societal restrictions were absent, he replied
that he would because giving alms “doth
also ease me.”14 Hobbes provided insight
into the neurological interactions associated
with prosocial behavior centuries prior to
discovery. He also proposed that the only
escape for mankind’s “perpetual and restless
desire of power after power” was death.
Considering prosocial altruistic acts
that lead to a fatal personal cost, the concept
of literal altruism is observed in a new light.
If the self dissipates from existence via
actions that are altruistic, then selfish desire
must also be absent from the action. Within
the Hindu belief system, adherents face a
personal reality that they are trapped with a
cyclic reincarnation characterized by
personal suffering. Here terminology of
good karma translates as positive
accumulating consequences of altruistic
behavior which will lead to a more
14
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advantageous state of reincarnation (a higher
caste or a more affluent organism).
Eventually, however, individuals reach a
prescribed level of Karmic advancement that
allows them a meditative transcendence to
obtain omniscient knowledge. In this, they
become like God and reabsorb into the
Primal One (God) ceasing to exist
altogether, but also simultaneously merge
into an all-encompassing, but transformed
existence. The dilemma that restricts literal
altruism as being factualized here is that
from another aspect of this situation, the
transcending Hindu is simply selfishly
avoiding a cyclic rebirth that is characterized
by personal suffering by acting altruistically;
this transcendence then falls more closely
within the confines of reciprocal altruism by
which a supernatural component is the
reciprocating benefactor. This situation is
identical to the individual lacking an anterior
insula, who still acts selfishly at the root of
prosocial behaviors as a mode of guilt
avoidance.
Altruism in Christianity
In response to Dawkins’ selfish gene
theory, Hill notes the “tendency of
sociobiologists to utilize reductionist
thinking and not acknowledge the whole
human person.”15 Dawkins’ reductionism
prevents the permissible existence of higher
order systems differing from their
constituent parts (selfish genes); this
ontological reductionism also leaves gaps
filled with suprascientific reasoning.16 One
such reasoning involves his proposal for
delegating the teaching of behaviors that are
unnaturally altruistic so as to improve the
quality of a world that is relentlessly selfish
and brutal. This lack of logical reasoning
instigates an unnecessary attack on
theological beliefs, forcing both
evolutionary and theology thinkers to
16
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definitively choose one incomplete and
unsubstantiated ideology over another.
Similarly, it would be unacceptable for
theological entities to impose a God-of-thegaps argument on evolutionists who are
considering theological beliefs. While
Dawkins’ insight into the selfish
components of genetic systems is
methodologically sound, his expansion of
reason onto higher-level systems lacks
perspective and logic that could permit
Christian theologians to accept these gene
qualities as exclusively admissible within
evolutionary thought.
Imagining that Christians could
accept an all-encompassing, genetic
selfishness as cause for all human behavior,
including altruism, several biblical
compromises of interpretation would be
made. In the realm of misinterpretation of
scripture, however, it is devisable to believe
in part that reciprocal altruism and inclusive
fitness are the only needed explanations for
selfless behavior. If the selfish-gene is the
sole motivator behind all prosocial behavior,
it is impossible to accept the idea of divinely
provided free-will. It would require a
reconstruction of interpretation of imago Dei
which Augustine characterizes as
humanity’s possession of “reason, or mind,
or understanding” that grants a superior
distinction from the rest of created life.17
Since these characteristics are ones of
higher-order systems acting independently
of selfish-gene influences, this interpretation
of the image of God in humanity does not
coincide with selfish gene theory.
Calvinistic interpretation classifies the
image of God under humanity’s
conformation to “function” and “order” as to
fulfill the image of God, rather than the
“possession of powers of reason.”18
Consequently accepting this position also

invites the belief in predestination since
gene-influences, rather than free-will, are
causation for all human behavior, including
altruism, morality, and ethics. Despite this,
Calvinist thought on the image of God in
humanity still incites a belief in purpose, as
associated with these suprascientific
concepts of right and wrong, that would not
logically interlock with the restrictive
selfish-gene theory.
It is upon these suprascientific
notions that a more complex view of
altruism is formed. John Polkinghorne
explains that while “kin altruism and
reciprocal altruism are enlightening,” the
human ability to act altruistically in response
to situations considered wrong “are facts
about the ethical reality within which we
function as morally responsible persons.”19
Explanations for a potential supranormal
altruism (outside biological constructs) are
present within a “Trinitarian framework”
that is dependent on a diety that is
“beneficent”.20 This view also relies on a
third interpretation of imago Dei which
attributes altruistic behavior as the
manifestation of God’s prosocial, Trinitarian
identity within humanity;21 this is an
amplification of Augustine’s interpretation
rather than a conflicting view that derives
the motivation of altruistic behaviors from
an inherent purpose of community. While
Christianity identifies the singularity of the
divine creator, the Triune of God, Jesus, and
the Holy Spirit fill different roles to
facilitate divine altruism as a behavioral
influence in humanity.
While God persists in this view as
benevolent and altruistic, Jesus exists as the
incarnation of God’s intended altruism
toward humanity. Dawkins’ invitation to
actively instruct rebellion against genetic
selfishness is ironically exemplified by the
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incarnate divine altruism of Jesus; God’s
image was embodied within a vessel with
both the permissibility of selfish genes, and
the divinity of supranormal altruism. Jesus
provided the exemplification of God’s
desired purpose for humanity which was a
“major evolutionary step in the moral
advancement of the human species.”22 The
role of the Holy Spirit within Trinitarian
altruism is to promote “inspiration of the
heart” or “moral inspiration” by which
altruistic actions can be divinely
influenced.23 Romans 8:5 implicates the
presence of an alternating and conflicting set
of desires: ones “according to the flesh” and
ones “in accordance with the Spirit.” This
message indicates a conscious abolition of
desires originating from selfish genes in turn
for a supranormal altruism that is distinct
from even psychosocial or environmental
influences altogether.
The debate over the plausibility of
literal altruism is not excused by
relinquishing of personal desire in exchange
for a supernatural one. An individual still
must consciously pursue a selfish desire of
transcending inherent selfishness;
selflessness is limited by the existence of the
self and logically, to be purely selfless, one
would have to have never existed initially.
This debate aside, individuals confuse the
association of selflessness (as a radically
pure concept) with the status of morality.
From a Christian standpoint, “one does not
have to be exclusively giving or refrain from
any reciprocity to found in the divine order
of love.”24 This is evident as the apostle Paul
describes in Romans 8:16-`7 (NIV) that as
“co-heirs with Christ… we share in his
suffering so that we may also share in his

glory.” Suffering indicates an altruistic
sacrifice as exemplified by Jesus, while
glory is a reciprocal benefit in response to
the action. Delineations of right and wrong
within prosocial behaviors ascribe that
altruism, with awareness of benefit, does not
implicate immorality, but altruism with
intent for benefit does.
Conclusion
With altruism being a primary
conduit for Christian apologetics, it is
important to correct indiscriminate
applications of this concept by clearly
defining the roles of the self within altruistic
behaviors. To promote that a morally
derived form of altruism is one of complete
and literal sacrifice of self is to promote a
contradiction against the existence of the
self; it also reduces morally derived selfsacrifice to an impossibility. If the proper
acknowledgement of a realistic reciprocal
altruism is accepted, then divine altruism
emerges within theological systems as a
means for prosocial interactions that do not
eliminate morality via the presence of
reciprocal benefit. Similarly, while
Dawkins’ selfish gene theory
methodologically advances understanding of
some altruistic behavioral influences, it
ontologically reduces the complexity of
altruism to these small genomic elements.
The consequence of this is a naturalistic
fallacy that eliminates both the existence of
more complex systems (brain, social
environment, psychology) and the potential
for positive integration of religion and
science.

Literature Cited
Barrett, P. (2015). The emergence of imagination and altruism in human evolution: Key elements
in a new-style natural theology. Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 15329-45.
22
23

Ibid. p. 42.
Quoted in Barrett, 2015.p. 38.

Dialogue & Nexus | Fall 2016-Spring 2017 |Volume 4

24

Op. cit. ref. 16, p. 101.

7

Altruistic Self
Carveth, D. L. (2015). The immoral superego: Conscience as the fourth element in the structural
theory of the mind. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 23(1), 206-223.
Dawkins, Richard. (1989). The selfish gene. New York: Oxford University Press.
Goleman, D. (2006). Social Intelligence: The revolutionary new science of human
relationships. New York: Bantam Dell.
Heffner, C. (2016). Freud’s structural and topographical model. Retrieved from
http://allpsych.com/psychology101/ego/
Hill, Matthew N. (2016). Evolution and holiness: Sociobiology, altruism, and the quest for
Wesleyan Perfection. Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity Press.
Mahoney, J. (2011). Christianity in evolution. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press
Marshall, J.A. (2016). What is inclusive fitness theory, and what is it for? Current Opinion in
Behavioral Sciences, 12, 103-108. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.09.2015
Masson, J. M., & McCarthy S. (1995). When elephants weep: The emotional lives of animals.
New York: Dell Publishing.
Numan, M. (2015). Neurobiology of social behavior. San Diego: Academic Press.
Steyn, P. (2014, Apr 3). Cat Watch. Retrieved from
http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/04/03/baby-baboons-dramatic-encounterwith-lions-ends-with-a-heroic-twist/
Yamaguchi, N., Cooper, A., Werdelin, L., & Macdonald, D. W. (n.d). Evolution of the mane and
group-living in the lion (Panthera leo): A review. Journal of Zoology (London), 263 (Part
4), 329-342.

Dialogue & Nexus | Fall 2016-Spring 2017 |Volume 4

8

